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BUCKLEY V . VALEO: A LANDMARK OF POLITICAL F REEDOM
by
Joel M. Gora*

It is appropriate for an article about the Supreme Court's Buckley
opinion to appear in a law review in the Buckeye State. In terms of poll
rankings, the Buckeye football team finished last season ranked number two in
the polls,1 which was much better than the Buckley decision, which many
academics have put on their list of the ten worst decisions of this century.2
While the football pollsters were right in ranking the Buckeyes so highly, the
academic pundits are dead wrong in rating the Buckley decision so poorly.
The Buckley decision, far from being a derelict ruling or a jurisprudential
*

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Staff Counsel and Associate Legal Director,
American Civil Liberties Union, 1969-1978. Co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). I would like to express my appreciation for a Brooklyn Law
School Summer Research Stipend grant for my work on this article.
1
Joe Drape, Mission Accomplished, If Sloppily, by the B.C.S., N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1999, at D6.
2

Cass R. Sunstein, Exchange; Speech in the Welfare State: Free Speech Now, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 255, 291 (1992); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986). At best, Buckley gets compared with and criticized like the
"discredited" Lochner doctrine which gave broad judicial protection to economic rights
against police power regulation . Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Worse
still, some compare Buckley to the Court's disastrous decision upholding the
"separate but equal" doctrine in race relations. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). Worst of all, some commentators have even compared Buckley to the Court's
tragic ruling in the infamous Dred Scott case (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393
(1857) which essentially upheld slavery and all but guaranteed the inevitability of the
Civil War. Scott Turow, The High Court's 20-Year-Old Mistake, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1997, Section 4, p. 15. The Buckley decision, however, is not without its prominent
academic defenders, many of whom feel that the Court's decision was basically
sound, so far as it went, but that the Court should have been more rigorous in its
scrutiny of the way in which limits on campaign funding limit political speech and
association. Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments,
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 1258 (1994); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political
Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997); Bradley Smith,
Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance
Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1056 (1996); It also has strong defenders among
nationally well-know First Amendment litigators.
Floyd Abrams, Look Who’s
Trashing the First Amendment, COLUM . JOURNALISM REV., November/December
(1997).
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outcast, is a landmark of political freedom, a ruling which carefully and
conscientiously addressed the critical issues of campaign finance controls and
free speech rights which still bedevil the nation today. Though not without
considerable flaws, the decision stands as a beacon illuminating the view of
First Amendment freedoms and political liberty that has informed Supreme
Court jurisprudence for the second half of this century. Compared to the limitsdriven repressive regime of government command and control of the political
process embodied in the Federal Election Campaign Act, the vision of the
Buckley opinion seeks to put as much control of the funding of the political
process as possible in the hands of the people, not the government.
A. The core of the First Amendment
Because of the efforts to demonize the Buckley ruling and the repeated
rhetoric about how our campaign finance system is corrupting the country and
undermining democracy, it is important to remember that campaign finance
laws operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment concern:
they regulate and restrain speech about government and politics. In a ruling
just four years ago, in a case arising in Ohio and involving regulation of
campaign literature, the Court reminded us of the dangers when government
attempts to regulate and control political speech, which, "as we have explained
on many prior occasions . . . occupies the core of the protection afforded by
the First Amendment . . . ."3 Quoting at length and with approval from Buckley,
the Court explained why this is so:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression in order “to assure
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.” Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484(1957). Although First
Amendment protections are not confined to
“the exposition of ideas,” Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948), “there is practically
universal agreement” that a major purpose of
that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of
3

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995).
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course including discussions of candidates . . .
.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
This no more than reflects our “profound
national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open,” New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In a
republic where the people are sovereign, the
ability of the citizenry to make informed choices
among candidates for office is essential, for the
identities of those who are elected will
inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation. As the Court observed in Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), “it
can hardly be doubted that the constitutional
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office.”4

That is why, the Court concluded, as it had in cases from Buckley on,
that laws regulating and burdening "core political speech" like a
campaign leaflet or the funding of political speech must be subject to
the most "exacting scrutiny."5
4

Id. at 346-347 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (1976)).

5

McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., dissent) and cases cited therein. In a way, the
Court's elegant constitutional language reflected its appreciation of an axiom of politics
occasionally expressed somewhat less elegantly: "Money is the Mother's Milk of
Politics." Actually, my own first encounter with campaign finance issues came in
1962 - well before my involvement in the Buckley case - as a college summer intern
with the Democratic State Central Committee in my native Los Angeles, when I
worked for the man who is widely-credited with having coined that phrase. He was a
well-known California politician named Jesse Unruh, who at the time was the powerful
Democratic Speaker of the California State Assembly. William Safire, Clone, Clone,
Clone, Clone, N. Y. TIMES, April 6, 1997, Sec. 6, p. 18. He was a prodigious fundraiser and pioneered what we now call "Leadership PACs." By centralizing fundraising for Democratic members of the State legislature, he was able to keep party
cohesion which was instrumental in the passage of numerous prominent, progressive
pieces of legislation, many of which bore his name. He helped the liberal Governor
Edmond G. "Pat" Brown gain an upset victory over former Vice-President Richard M.
Nixon in the 1962 gubernatorial race. As Curtis Gans frequently points out, much of
the most important progressive legislation of the 20th century was passed during a
time when politicians raised funds in a largely unregulated manner such as that. 143
Cong. Rec. S. 10103, 10135 (1997).
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My intern's job, however, was to organize the more grass-roots-oriented doorto-door "Dollars for Democrats" campaign, which made me appreciate, even back
then, that it is easier to raise campaign funds in large chunks than in small bites of
one dollar at a time.
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B. The initial victims of campaign finance reform
Even before Buckley, the civil liberties community and the courts began
to encounter the difficulty of reconciling campaign finance controls with First
Amendment rights. The first significant case arose when three old-time
dissenters came into the offices of the ACLU in the Spring of 1972, with what
seemed an incredible story. In late May of that year, they had sponsored a
two-page ad in The New York Times advocating the impeachment of President
Richard Nixon for bombing Cambodia and praising the handful of Members of
Congress who had voted against the bombing. The United States Justice
Department hauled the group into federal court, demanded to know how they
were organized and who had paid for the ad, threatened the group with
injunctions for what they had done and told them they could not engage in
further political speech of that nature unless they filed reports and disclosures
with the government and otherwise complied with a wide variety of rules and
regulations.6 This was all for sponsoring an advertisement publicly criticizing
the President of the United States.
Such a consequence seemed particularly paradoxical because this was
a time when First Amendment case law had developed its most rigorous
protection of citizen criticism of government officials and policies.7 How, in the
face of that law, could the Government file a lawsuit to suppress that very same
citizen criticism of government?

6

United States v. Nat’l. Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); see
generally, Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. Section 431, et seq.
7

See, e.g. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding protection of subversive
or revolutionary advocacy of force and violence short of imminent and likely incitement
thereof); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); (finding
protection against prior restraint of "The Pentagon Papers" since government had not
met its "heavy burden of justification" for such a restriction of public discussion); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (granting press broad immunity to
comment about politicians without fear of libel suits, in recognition of the "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.") ; Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (finding “no test of reasonableness" can save a statute
that makes it a crime for a newspaper to editorially endorse a political candidate on
Election Day.); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding protection of even the
most vulgar form of language used in public in a political setting).
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The answer, of course, was campaign finance reform. The government
was suing under the brand new Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.8 The
government's theory was that the two-page ad - even though it spoke solely
about issues - mentioned, criticized or praised people who were candidates for
election that year and that this might affect public opinion, which, in turn, might
somehow influence the outcome of the federal elections that year.
Accordingly, this rendered this ad hoc group a "political committee," which had
to file reports with the government and disclose their contributors and
supporters, and, if they failed to do so, they would be enjoined from further
political speech until they complied.
In addition, to the extent that the advertisement could be interpreted as
"on behalf of" those political figures who were praised and/or "in derogation of"
those officials who were criticized, not only did such content render the group a
regulatable political committee, but the Act and implementing regulations
imposed new controls on the placement of such messages in the news media.
The rationale of the provision was to enforce a new statutory ceiling on
communication media expenditures by federal candidates. But the effect of the
rules was that newspapers, magazines, electronic broadcasters and virtually
any other medium of mass communication could not even accept for
publication such independent citizen political communication unless proper
certifications had been provided by the candidates who benefitted from the
message - either because they were praised or because their opponents were
criticized. For any news medium to run such advertisements without such
proper certification - which as a practical matter would be impossible to obtain would constitute a criminal offense by the news medium. A harsher example of
a system of prior restraint could hardly be imagined.9
In one sense, though, the government was right. Speech like that might
influence people's opinion about Members of Congress, about incumbent
politicians, about the President of the United States, and that, in turn, might
influence their vote at the polls and, ultimately, the outcome of the election.
And if one is serious about regulating the sources of campaign funding, then
8

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431, et. seq. Most of the
more sweeping provisions that would be at issue in Buckley were passed three years
later as the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.
9

United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d. at 1142. That separate
provision, operating directly on the press, but restraining both the press and the
independent speakers, was directly challenged and found facially unconstitutional in
American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (threejudge court); vacated as moot, sub. nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union,
422 U.S. 1030 (1975). The New York Times supported the ACLU in that challenge to
the media certification provision.
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those "issue ads" cannot be allowed to slip by. The anti-Nixon, impeachment
advertisement cost $18,000. Adjusted for inflation, that would be about
$50,000 today. That is serious money. So if we are to be serious about
controlling political funding, and limiting those who do "too much" of it, or
"leveling the playing field," or guarding against people using money to "buy
access and influence," then we better be prepared to face the prospect of
going after people like the ad hoc impeachment group with injunctions and
fines and maybe even criminal penalties for pooling their resources and
speaking out on the public issues of the day and the public officials involved in
those issues.
And if all that has a familiar ring to it, and sounds, in the words of that
great modern philosopher, Yogi Berra, "like deja vu all over again," it is
because legislative proposals on the front burner today - most notably the
McCain-Feingold bill in the United States Senate, and the Shays-Meehan bill
which passed the House during the summer of 1998 - would achieve virtually
the same kinds of controls on political speech that were at issue and rejected
twenty-five years ago in the impeachment ad case.10
10

The most recent version of the McCain-Feingold bill is § 26, The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 1999. See 145 Cong. Rec. § 396 (January 19, 1999). To give some
flavor of how sweeping the multiple page bill is, here are excerpts from a press release
issued from Senator McCain's office on the day the bill was introduced and describing
key features of the bill. With regard to "soft money":
The central component of McCain-Feingold, this provision would
prohibit all soft money contributions to the national political parties
from corporations, labor unions and wealthy individuals. In addition,
state parties that are permitted under state law to accept these
unregulated contributions would be prohibited from spending them on
activities relating to federal elections such as voter registration within
120 days of a federal election, get out the vote campaigns, and
campaign advertising that mentions a federal candidate. In addition,
federal candidates would be prohibited from raising soft money in
connection with a federal election. The bill also prohibits the parties
from raising money for or transferring money to tax-exempt
organizations.
Id.
With regard to "issue advocacy:"
The Snowe-Jeffords amendment, adopted as part of McCain-Feingold
during the Senate's February 1998 campaign finance debate,
address the explosion of thinly-veiled campaign advertising funded by
corporate and union treasuries. These ads skirt federal election law
by avoiding the use of direct entreaties to "vote for" or "vote against"
a particular candidate. The amendment defines a new category of

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

That impeachment advertisement case was a wake-up call to the
ferocious First Amendment problems that campaign finance laws could pose.
Now, 25 years later, the issues of money, politics, free speech, and, indeed,
democracy itself, remain very much the same.
But that is getting a little bit ahead of the story.
In the impeachment ad case, in 1972, the court ruled that campaign
finance laws could not be used against non-partisan, issue-oriented groups
engaged in public commentary about the political issues of the day and the
public officials involved in those issues. Another prominent court came to a
similar conclusion one year later and invalidated the application of the relevant
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act to groups like the ACLU
whose "major purpose" was the discussion of public issues, not the election of
political candidates.11

'electioneering communications' that refer to a clearly identified
candidate or candidates; appear within 30 days of a primary or 60
days of a general election; and are broadcast on TV (including cable
or satellite) or radio to the candidate's electorate. This definition
would NOT include any printed communication, direct mail, voter
guides, or the Internet. The amendment prohibits unions and forprofit corporations from directly or indirectly making electioneering
communications using treasury funds. Only voluntarily contributed
PAC money could be used for these types of communications. The
amendment permits 501(c)(4) non-profit corporations to make
electioneering communications as long [as] they use only individual
contributions (not corporate or union funds) and make certain
disclosures. The amendment prevents unions or corporations from
laundering funds through non-profits to make electioneering
communications. The amendment provides for disclosure by groups
making electioneering communications that total $10,000 or more in
an election cycle. The group must disclose its identity, the cost of
the communication, and the names and addresses of all contributors
of $500 or more to the sponsor of the communication within the
cycle....The amendment makes clear that electioneering
communications that are coordinated with a federal candidate or a
political party committee are contributions to that candidate or party
committee.
Id.
Although the bill exempts print media messages, it otherwise would reach precisely
the kind of message contained in the impeachment ad case.
11

United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (1972); American
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C. Campaign Finance Reform Run Riot
Within a year, we had Watergate revelations of campaign funding
excesses, and even though much of that occurred before effective disclosure
went into effect, Congress was stampeded into enacting the sweeping 1974
restrictions on political activity that would give rise to the constitutional
challenge in Buckley v. Valeo. In an atmosphere filled with the same kind of
rhetoric that we hear today about how money is corrupting politics and
destroying democracy, Congress passed a law that was the archetype of
government control of political funding and therefore of political speech,
association and communication. And that meant government control,
ultimately, of democracy itself, because, as the Supreme Court has told us time
and again, freedom of political speech is the engine of democracy: "speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment."12
That law13 severely restricted candidates, campaigns, contributors,
independent political groups, and even non-partisan issue groups like the
ACLU, who had just been assured by the courts that their advocacy would be
free of official restraint. And enforcement of those new restrictions was placed
in the hands of a commission completely dominated and controlled by the
House and Senate - a cynical breach of traditional separation of powers
principles that the Buckley Court would soon declare invalid.14
Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D. D. C. 1973) The validity of the
"major purpose" test, as a constitutionally-required or statutorily-based limiting gloss
on the applicability of the federal election campaign laws to non-partisan groups was
before the Court more recently in FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), but the Court did
not reach or decide the issue.
12

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964).

13

That law, the Federal Election of 1971, Public Law 92-255, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et.
seq.[herinafter ‘71 Act], was amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, PUB . L. NO. 93-443; supra note 8.
14

Indeed, the portion of Buckley which unanimously invalidated the manner in which
members of the Federal Election Commission were appointed because of the
substantial powers they were given set the tone for two decades of Supreme Court
rulings finding that various corner-cutting government mechanisms that Congress had
established in ways that departed from the specific design of the Constitution's
separation and balance of powers were unconstitutional. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 143 (1976); see also Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986); Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 1551 (1998). The only major statute
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(1) The Act severely restricted a candidate's overall campaign expenditures,
even if the funding all came from small contributions. Even many Buckley
critics might concede that the spending limits in the Act were unconscionably
low and incumbent-protective.15 The spending limit for House races was
$70,000, an extremely low figure even by 1974 standards, and an amount less
than the amount that each House members spent on the average on the free
mail frank and constituent services.
(2) The Act severely limited the amount of money candidates could contribute
to their own campaigns, even though candidates could not possibly corrupt
themselves. Had they used their money to run for the White House, Ross
Perot and Steve Forbes would have wound up in the Big House.
(3) Perhaps even worse, independent speakers were all but completely
silenced by the new law which placed a ceiling of $1,000 on how much any
person could spend on what we now call "independent expenditures." That
was about the cost of a one-quarter page ad in The New York Times, criticizing
or praising the President of the United States. Spend a dime more on political
speech and your free speech would become a felony. What a breathtaking
and extraordinary restriction. This unprecedented provision was justified as a
"loophole-closing device" which would prevent political supporters who could no
longer make large contributions directly to candidates from making large
independent expenditures instead. Of course, the loophole being closed was
essentially the First Amendment itself and its guarantee of no Congressional
abridgements of "the freedom of speech." Only Justice Byron White would
have sustained this remarkable provision. Today, $1,000 would barely buy a
tombstone ad on the front page of The New York Times. Had this provision
been sustained and unchanged, it would effectively have eliminated the use of
editorial advertisements by citizens to criticize incumbent officials and political
candidates.

upheld against a separation of powers challenge was one of the other great postWatergate "reforms" which would cure corruption and unaccountable power forever,
namely, the Independent Counsel Act. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
15

Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution: A Critical Look at Buckley v.
Valeo, 1997: Hearings on Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform Before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 105th Congress
(1997) (statement by Burt Neuborne, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law at New
York University and Legal Director of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU); Cass R.
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequence, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 1390
(1994).
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(4) Make the smallest of campaign donations and you would get your name
and political affiliation publicly disclosed or kept on file with the government.16
Even controversial, minor and third parties that the government spent a lot of
time and money spying on, would have to disclose their most modest
contributors, although that might subject such individuals to harassment and
retaliation.17
(5) All the issue-oriented groups that report and comment on the records of
incumbents up for re-election would likewise have to file reports with the
government disclosing their contributors and supporters. Indeed, the sweeping
reforms included one provision specifically targeted on issue advocacy groups
that rate and provide "box scores" about how members of Congress vote on
issues of concern to the individual groups.18 Challenged along with the other

16

The ‘71 Act required covered political committees and organizations to disclose the
names and addresses of all individuals who contributed more than $100 and to keep
on file the names and address of all individuals who contributed as little as $11.
Federal Election of 1971, Public Law 92-255, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et. seq.
17

In Buckley, though sustaining the disclosure provisions on their face, the Court did
indicate that where controversial political parties or groups could make a credible
showing that disclosure would lead to harassment and disruption, they might be
constitutionally immune from compliance with campaign reporting and disclosure
rules. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74. That principle would be applied six years later to hold
that campaign committees formed by parties like the Socialist Workers' Party would
be immune from effective disclosure. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign
Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982).
18

That section was § 437a of the Act, 2 U.S.C. codified at § 437 (a). Its rather clumsy
language provided as follows:
Any person (other than an individual) who expends any funds or
commits any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing
the outcome of an election, or who publishes or broadcasts to the
public any material referring to a candidate (by name, description, or
other reference) advocating the election or defeat of such candidate,
setting forth the candidate's position on any public issue, his voting
record, or other official acts (in the case of a candidate who holds or
has held Federal office), or otherwise designed to influence
individuals to cast their votes for or against such candidate or to
withhold their votes from such candidate shall file reports with the
Commission as if such person were a political committee. The
reports filed by such person shall set forth the source of the funds
used in carrying out any activity described in the preceding sentence
in the same detail as if the funds were contributions within the
meaning of section 431(e) of this title, and payments of such funds in
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key provisions of the Act, that section was unanimously declared
unconstitutional by a D.C. Circuit which was enthralled by every other
significant feature of the law. Only that section drew the complete
condemnation of judges spanning the ideological spectrum from Bazelon and
Wright to Tamm and Wilkey. The en banc D.C. Circuit unanimously ruled the
provision defectively vague and overbroad for seeking to regulate core and
vital issue speech unconnected to the specific cause of any candidate.19 It was
an impermissible restriction of citizen and organizational speech about
important public issues. The Government did not take an appeal from that
ruling and the section was allowed to die, only to see attempts at resurrection
in recent years.20

the same detail as if they were expenditures within the meaning of
section 431(f) of this title. The provisions of this section do not apply
to any publication or broadcast of the United States Government or
to any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the
facilities of a broadcasting station or a bona fide newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication.
Id.
19
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 843-44 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(en banc).
20

It has not gone remarked sufficiently that key elements of the various bills like
McCain-Feingold or Shays-Meehan seek to regulate issue advocacy in language
virtually indistinguishable from § 437a which was roundly and conclusively condemned
as unconstitutional in Buckley. They are virtually reincarnations of that flawed and
condemned provision. As one commentator recently put it:
Section 437a has the distinction of being the only section of the
post- Watergate reforms struck down by what, at the time, was the
most liberal pro- campaign finance regulation court in the country.
Even to that naturally sympathetic court, Section 437a was beyond
the constitutional pale. In fact, the section was so indefensible that
its overturning was not appealed to the Supreme Court by any of its
defenders, including the Department of Justice, the FEC, or their
allied reform groups (including Common Cause). Even though the
question was not presented directly, the Supreme Court's 1976
decision in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, firmly enunciated the principles that
led the D.C. Circuit to strike down Section 437a. The Supreme Court
noted that: The distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may
often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative
proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates
campaign on the basis of their positions on various public issues,
but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set forth in Buckley the holding,
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But otherwise, the lower court upheld the major features of the new act.
How could this sweeping monitoring and control of political speech and activity
possibly be called "reform?" Especially since as breathtaking as the law was in
terms of the political activity it sought to control, it was no less cynical in what it
exempted from those controls. The most outrageous exemption was for the
costs of free franked mail, which by itself, gave incumbent House Members
more money to spend on political communication with their constituents than
the whole amount that a challenger was allowed to spend on his or her entire
campaign under the new spending limits.21 How is that creating a level playing
field for incumbents?
To groups like the ACLU, these did not seem to be genuine reforms
that would expand political participation and opportunity. Rather, they seemed
more to be an unprecedented Incumbent Protection Act. They would suppress
the individual and group political advocacy which is at "the core of our electoral
process and of the First Amendment freedoms"22 and which is the very engine
of democracy. That is why House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt could not
have been more wrong when he insisted that: "What we have is two important
values in direct conflict: freedom of speech and our desire for healthy
campaigns in a healthy democracy . . . . You can't have both."23 In fact, and in
law, there cannot be one without the other.

D. The Triumph of Reason
That was the statutory scheme that the Court had before it in Buckley,
which has been severely criticized and even demonized.24 While certainly not
which is valid to this day, that only speech expressly advocating the
election or defeat of clearly identified candidates may be subjected to
certain forms of regulation, including compulsory disclosure to the
government.
Jan Witold Baran, The Reform That Cannot and Should Not Ever Happen, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, at S.36. That court ruling calls into severe question many of the
proposals today to control issue group spending and thereby speaking.
21
Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32
(1968)) (emphasis added).
23

Nancy Gibbs, The Wake-Up Call: Clinton Makes Serious Noises About Campaign
Reform, But That May Not Be Enough To Change A Cozy System That Loves SpecialInterest Money, TIME , Feb. 3, 1997, at p. 22.
24
Supra note 2.
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without its flaws, the decision, properly considered, is a landmark of political
freedom. 25 The Court correctly recognized that limitations on political funding
are limitations on political speech and thereby threatened well-established
principles at the core of the First Amendment's protection.
To the argument that money is not speech, the Court quite sensibly
responded that limitations on how much one could spend to speak were
limitations on how much one could speak. Whether the subject is funding for
political speech or funding for the arts or funding for abortion counseling or
funding for legal services programs - or funding for campaign finance reform
advocacy - there is an obvious and inextricable link between restrictions on
funding and restrictions on speech, and the Buckley Court soundly recognized
that: "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached."26 Indeed, in cases both
before and after Buckley, the Court has consistently understood that efforts to
restrain the funding of speech are tantamount to efforts to restrain the speech

25

For a particularly powerful and relatively contemporary paean to the wisdom of the
Buckley decision, see Scot Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment,
1982 SUP . CT . REV. 243 (1982).
26

One of the abiding ironies of the campaign finance reform debate is that so many
who attack the Court for "equating" money with speech haven’t the slightest hesitation
to use their own, often unlimited resources to argue that money is not speech.
Presumably the unimaginably wealthy proponents of controlling campaign funding have
no embarrassment about using their own extraordinary resources to communicate that
message. Either they fail to see the irony or prefer the adage of fighting fire with fire.
Groups urging efforts to take private money out of politics have no hesitation to take
millions of dollars of private money to put forth their message. See Dierdre
Shesgreen, But Proliferation of Groups Doesn’t Spur Progress in Curbing Political
Cash, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at p. 1. One article observed that George Soros,
the billionaire philanthropist, gave $3,000,000 to Public Campaign, a group which
argues that the wealthy have too much influence over our public life. See Greg Pierce,
Double Standard, W ASH. TIMES, June 18, 1997, p. A10. The billionaire financier,
Jerome Kohlberg, supports a campaign finance reform organization which spent
$400,000 to try to defeat a Senate candidate whose politics he did not like. See Ruth
Marcus, The Advocates Pipe Down the Ads, W ASH. P OST , October 23, 1998 , p. A10.
Of course, the most chronic examples of irony are the multimillionaire owners of the
nation’s newspapers, most of whom editorially and passionately support funding
controls on others, while using their own extensive wealth to fund their newspapers
and magazines to make that point. See Ira Glasser, Campaign “Reform” Limits
Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, p. A. 24.
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itself and has applied the Buckley principles to invalidate such schemes.27
Such rulings were particularly appropriate since the restrictions in Buckley and
similar cases were on the use of private funds and resources to communicate
private political messages, not on the use of public funds to facilitate those
messages.28
To the claim, relentlessly repeated today, that there is "too much"
campaign spending and that it must be controlled by government, the Court
responded that the First Amendment fundamentally denies government the
right to make that choice:
The First Amendment denies government the
power to determine that spending to promote
one’s political views is wasteful, excessive, or
unwise. In the free society ordained by our
Constitution, it is not the government but the
people -- individually as citizens and
candidates and collectively as associations and
political committees - who must retain control
over the quantity and range of debate on
public issues in a political campaign.29
27

The cases before Buckley include New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (holding the fact that political advertisement is paid for does not justify depriving
it of First Amendment protection); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (finding the
fact that abortion services advertisement is paid for does not justifying withdrawing
First Amendment protection). Since Buckley, the Court has applied its principle
numerous times to invalidate statutes and rules which attempted to restrain speech by
restraining the funding of that speech. See, e.g. Buckley v. American Constitutional
Law Foundation, 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999) (invalidating, inter alia, rule that paid petitionsignature collectors had to disclose sources of funding); United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (invalidating rule that federal
employees could not be paid honorariums for giving speeches or writing articles while
off-duty); Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (invalidating rule that prevented criminals from receiving
money for writing or speaking about his or her crime); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414
(1988) (invalidating rule that prohibited paying people to circulate petitions to get
signatures to put a voter initiative on the ballot).
28

In the more complex area of government efforts to control the speech uses of public
funds, the Court has also recognized the important link between money and speech,
but has been far too willing to let the government use its power of the purse to control
the speech of those it patronizes. The issues were addressed most prominently by
the Court in National Endowment v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), which upheld certain
vague government restraints on governmentally funded art subsidized by the NEA.
29
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
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Who would quarrel with that principle?
To the claim that the free speech of those with more resources could
be restrained in order to enhance the political opportunity of those with less
resources - a kind of First Amendment Lowest Common Denominator, a
principle for leveling down freedom of speech - the Court responded:
The concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which
was designed to secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered
exchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and societal changes desired by the
people.30
That too embodies settled doctrine. Buckley critics often stress the first part of
this quote, to create the impression that the decision is some kind of royalist
ruling, while underplaying the second portion of the quote which makes it clear
that the evil of restricting some speakers is the consequent restraint on public
discussion and the instrumental role of freedom of speech and press.
Finally, in answering the claim that issue-oriented speech about
incumbent politicians must be regulated because it might influence public
opinion and thereby affect the outcome of elections, the Court, with great force,
reminded us of the critical relationship between unfettered issue advocacy and
healthy democracy. "Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution."31 And with equal clarity, the Court
observed that in an election season one cannot abstractly discuss issues
without discussing the candidates and their stands on those issues.
The distinction between discussion of issues
and candidates and advocacy of election or
defeat of candidates may often dissolve in
practical application. Candidates, especially
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues
involving
legislative
proposals
and
governmental actions. Not only do candidates
30

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (emphasis added).
424 U.S. at 14. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).

31
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campaign on the basis of their positions on
various public issues, but campaigns
themselves generate issues of public interest.32

If any reference to a candidate in the context of advocacy on an issue
rendered the speaker or the speech subject to campaign finance controls, the
consequences for First Amendment rights would be intolerable.33
Accordingly, in order to protect First Amendment rights, the Court
fashioned the critical "express advocacy" requirement, which holds that only
the funding of express advocacy of electoral outcomes may be subject to
restraint. All speech which does not in express terms advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate must remain totally free of any
regulation: "So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,
they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his
views."34 The Court thus reaffirmed two principles which are critical to today's
debate over campaign finance regulation: 1) The area in which campaign
finance controls may operate has to be narrowly and carefully and clearly
defined; and, 2) Outside of such area of permissible regulation, no, to repeat,
no controls are allowable. These principles, which seem almost self-evident,

32

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
For example:
[W]hether words intended and designed to fall short
of invitation would miss that mark is a question both
of intent and of effect. No speaker, in such
circumstances, safely could assume that anything
he might say upon the general subject would not be
understood by some as an invitation. In short, the
supposedly
clear-cut
distinction
between
discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and
solicitation puts the speaker in these
circumstances wholly at the mercy of the varied
understanding of his hearers and consequently of
whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent
and meaning. Such a distinction offers no security
for free discussion. In these conditions it blankets
with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels
the speaker to hedge and trim.
Id. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
34
424 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added).
33
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are nonetheless once again threatened by legislative proposals like McCainFeingold and Shays-Meehan pending in Washington and in many States.35
E. Compromise Controls
Those portions of Buckley which struck limits on campaign funding
vindicated core First Amendment rights in ways that justify praise and certainly
do not merit the condemnation that Buckley routinely receives. But other parts
of the Court's decision bear the hallmark of judicial compromise and have
created a regime of partial regulation which has become the epitome of
unintended and undesirable consequences.
First, while striking down limits on expenditures by candidates, political
committees or individuals, the Court reversed field and upheld limits on
contributions by individuals to political candidates and campaign committees.
The Court did so because of its sense that restraints on contributions were less
severe than those on expenditures, while more directly implicating concerns
with the actual or potential or apparent corrupting effect of "large" contributions
on political candidates who are and/or will become public officials. Though
noting that the "Act's contributions and expenditure limitations operate in an
area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities,"36 the Court
nonetheless concluded that limits on campaign contributions are somehow
"lesser" restraints because contributions are one step removed from speech
compared to expenditures, the amount of a contribution does not add
appreciably to the message of support it embodies and contributors are free to
spend unlimited amounts to promote their chosen candidate or cause directly
and independently.37 With respect to corruption, the Court stated that:
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's
primary purpose - to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual financial contributions - in order to
find a constitutionally sufficient justification for
the $1,000 contribution limitation. [T]o the
extent that large contributions are given to
secure political quid pro quos from current and
potential officeholders, the integrity of our

35

Supra note 7.

36

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,14 (1976).

37

Id. at 35.
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system of representative
undermined.38

democracy

is

The Court's upholding of contribution limits gave insufficient weight to a
number of critical arguments pressed by the challengers. First, a restraint on
contributions would become a defacto restraint on expenditures, especially for
those candidates who are not well-connected or well-heeled. The primary
beneficiaries of the upholding of contribution limits have been personally
wealthy candidates who do not need the kindness of strangers and incumbents
who have more than enough "friends" or groups of friends, i.e. PACs, to help
fund them. That is one reason why incumbency rates have remained extremely
high.
Second, unless adjusted for inflation - which they have not been - those
contribution limits make it harder and harder for candidates, especially
challengers, to raise funds to get their message out. Indeed, a number of
lower courts have recently invalidated "reform" enactments that lowered
contributions limits to levels as low as $250 or even $100, reasoning that such
Draconian restraints made it all but impossible for non-wealthy candidates to
raise funds for their campaigns.39 Some courts have even held that a $1,000
contribution limit - the exact amount sustained in Buckley, but equivalent today
to a $320 ceiling in 1976 terms - failed to survive strict scrutiny where it was set
at such a low level - in effect $320 in 1976 dollars - that it bore no rational
relationship to deterring corruption, especially where the limits were put into
place in the absence of any record of corruption remotely comparable to that
presented in Buckley. Indeed, the Court has granted review in one of those
cases, placing on the table the question of how relatively low contribution limits
can be sustained 25 years after Buckley.40
38

Id. at 27.
National Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia Board of Election and Ethics, 924
F Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996) vacated as moot, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 168
F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1999); California Profile Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282,
1295 (E.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 164 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999). But see: Kentucky Right to
Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 645-651 (6th Cir. 1997).
39

40

The case is Shrink Missouri PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), where the lower court invalidated contribution limits of
$250 for state assembly, $500 for state Senate and $1,000 for statewide office. The
Court denied certiorari in two cases from Ohio directly challenging Buckley=s ruling
that you cannot have expenditure limits. Those two cases would have permitted the
Court directly to consider the validity of Buckley’s disallowence of expenditure limits.
Kruse v. City of Cincinnatti, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 511
(1998) (striking a Cincinnati ordinance which limited expenditures in City Council races
and which was intended to be a test case of Buckley); Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d
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Third, the challengers claimed that the tight controls over contributions
would cause campaign funding to flow to areas of political communication which
were not subject to those restraints, most notably, issue advocacy and political
party activity funded by "soft money," which is funding precisely not limited to
$1,000 from individuals. The Court seemed unmoved by these concerns. But
the phenomena of issue advocacy and soft money - and proposals to control
both - have dominated campaign finance debate and proposals in recent
years.
Moreover, the Court gave insufficient attention to the argument that
there were less drastic alternatives to deal with the actuality and potential of
corruption than the problematic use of contribution limits. The major
suggestion was the use of effective disclosure of large contributions to
candidates and campaign committees so that the public would have the means
to ferret out whatever undue access and influence might possibly be accorded
to campaign contributors. But the Court concluded that full disclosure, coupled
with laws against bribery and conflict of interest and the activities of a vigorous
free press, was an insufficient inoculation or antidote to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.41
Finally, the Court also sustained a scheme of public funding for
Presidential candidates. That, too, has been a mixed blessing. Of course,
523, 528-533 (6th Cir. 1998), cert.denied 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999) (invalidating campaign
expenditure limits for judicial elections).
41

Often overlooked in the debates about Buckley is the fact that the Court also upheld
against constitutional challenge the Act's sweeping and overbroad disclosure
requirements. As indicated above, campaign contributors of as little as $101 dollars equivalent to $32 today - would have to be automatically publicly disclosed.
Contributors who gave as little as $11 - about $3.50 today - would have their names
stored for supplying to the government upon demand. While the challengers argued
that disclosure was a less drastic and more democratic remedy to the concerns with
corruption and undue access and influence, the argument was limited to "large"
contributions to mainline candidates and parties where there was a real impact.
Instead, the Court, though acknowledging that compelled disclosure can substantially
interfere with freedom of association, sustained the wide-sweeping disclosure that
invades an extremely broad area of political privacy without any sufficient justification.
The Court felt that the low disclosure levels were reasonable attempts to detect
patterns of giving and to discourage violations of the contribution limits. Though the
Court did show some sensitivity to the plight of controversial minor parties, which
would lead to a later ruling that such groups did not have to disclose their contributors
and supporters, See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S.
87 (1982) the Court nonetheless upheld the facial validity of the disclosure rules.
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public funding can be an important antidote to the concerns with corruption
from private contributions, and the proper kind of public funding can expand
the spectrum of political participation and opportunity in a very meaningful way.
The Court recognized that potential, but the scheme it upheld contained two
serious flaws.
First, the funding arrangement is basically designed to benefit the two
major political parties and their candidates, with a premium on past electoral
success as a measure of current public benefit. Minor parties and new
candidates basically need not apply for pre-election funding. The Court
sustained this scheme against an Equal Protection challenge. Second, the
funding arrangement requires eligible candidates to limit their overall and stateby-state expenditures in order to get primary matching funds. In order to get
general election funds, presidential candidates have to agree not to raise or
spend even $1.00 of private money.
That stipulation, in turn, has had two consequences. First, it has
legitimized, without serious consideration, a form of "unconstitutional
conditions" whereby candidates must give up all rights to raise and spend
private funds in order to receive public campaign funds. This has guaranteed
that almost all public funding proposals pressed at the federal level and
enacted at the state and local level will have strings attached and, in all
likelihood, will benefit incumbents over challengers because the arrangements
are limits-driven.42
Second, and most notably, the conditioned limits on public funding have
led inexorably to the soft money phenomenon and to the rise of “soft money”
and multi- million dollar party “issue campaigns” run to skirt those limits.
F. Lessons for the Future
If there is any lesson we should have learned from 25 years of
campaign finance controls, it is that limits on campaign funding, apart from
constitutional questions, have an equally critical flaw: they just do not work.
Trying to equalize political opportunity and influence through limiting
political speech and association is a futile task. Limit the funding of the
candidates equally, and the advantage of incumbency or celebrity will disturb
the equilibrium, as will the presence of powerful outside voices, independent

42

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Reply: Political Money and Freedom of Speech: A Reply to
Frank Askin, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1083 (1998); See also Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d
940 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding triggered public funding.)

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

political groups, labor unions, issue groups and the news media.43 Limit
wealthy contributors from giving money to candidates, and they will still be able
to buy newspapers, fund issue groups and give large amounts of "soft money"
to get their message out in ways that the average person can never hope to
equal. The ability of a George Soros or a Rupert Murdock to use their vast
funds to influence the debate on political candidates and public issues for
example, campaign finance reform - is limitless compared to the average
citizen. Attempt to limit all those voices and methods of influencing the
electorate, on the claim that they are "buying elections" or "drowning out the
voice of the people" and you have a First Amendment meltdown.44
Far better to deal with such disparities by encouraging average people
to band together in groups to support issues and candidates that appeal to
them to counter the wealthy few. That is what freedom of speech and
association are all about.
The 1974 law limited individual contributions to House and Senate
candidates, and we have witnessed a proliferation of PACs, and independent
groups and issue advocacy. Challengers have a hard time raising money and
incumbents are more insulated against effective challenge. Things are easy
only for the well-heeled or the well-connected.

43

Michael Janofsky, Gore Building Network in California, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999,
Section 1, Page 24. See also Bernard Weinraub, Hollywood Raises Curtain on 2000,
N.Y. TIMES, February 20, 1999, A8 (noting that both Democratic and Republican
Presidential hopefuls “troop in almost every week to gather support from the rich and
super-rich” among the Hollywood and entertainment industry moguls.) Compare the
remark in Buckley that public financing of presidential elections would be “a means of
eliminating the improper influence of large private contributions . . . .” Buckley, 424
U.S. at 96.
44

Some scholars think that controls on wealthy media owners or other speakers in the
service of campaign finance reform and equalization would justify restraints on such
publishers. See Richard Hasen Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch
Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999) (arguing that it would be permissible to cover
media under campaign finance laws, especially if the equality of political opportunity
theme rejected in Buckley were adopted by the Court. See also, Richard L. Hasen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign
Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Scott E. Thomas, Corporate Funds: Use
in Campaign Banned, W ALL STREET JOURNAL, March 12, 1999, at A15 (Letter to Wall
Street Journal from Scott Thomas, Commissioner of the FEC, justifying the proceeding
(later dropped) against Steve Forbes for that portion of his monthly magazine column
deemed partisan and not issue-oriented). Normal First Amendment instincts are
fundamentally averse to such government micro management of media and politics.
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The law sharply limited contributions to Presidential candidates, and we
have seen the splurge of soft money funding that has gone on for almost 20
years. The highly structured system of public financing of Presidential
elections, hailed as a model of reform, has become the poster child of the
failure of limits-driven public campaign funding controls. Political parties have
spent millions of dollars on "image ads" to influence public opinion in ways
favorable to their party or candidate. Make no mistake, the millions of dollars
spent by the Democratic Party on such ads effectively decided the outcome of
the 1996 Presidential campaign in favor of President Clinton before that
campaign had even officially begun.
The Court's split decision in Buckley has helped create the campaign
finance dilemma we have had ever since. Wealthy candidates can spend
unlimited funds on campaigns, while less wealthy candidates are severely
limited in trying to raise funds from others to get their message out.
Incumbents have built-in fund-raising advantages, while non-wealthy
challengers must scramble for funds. People or organizations who want to give
financial support directly to candidates and parties are restrained from doing
so, but permitted to support issue advocacy or "soft money" party activity
without restraint. Public funding is available but only primarily to mainstream
parties and candidates and only with acceptance of limiting conditions and
stipulations.
G. "Reform" Makes a Comeback
The current "reform" bills pending in Washington and many of the
States embody the same kind of limits-based approach that has failed time and
again in the past. "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it."45
Two particular features of many of these bills require analysis: the
unprecedented controls on issue advocacy and soft money.
H. Issue Advocacy
The bills' unprecedented regulations of issue advocacy are flatly
unconstitutional under settled First Amendment rules. And no amount of
pejorative references to "phony" issue ads or "so-called" issue ads or "sham"
issue ads can avoid that fact.
45

George Santayana, The Life of Reason; Vol I, Reason in Common Sense, quoted in
BARTLETT 'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS , p. 703 (1982). This year's version of McCainFeingold is S. 26, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999. See supra note 7.
The Shays-Meehan parallel bill in the House is H.R. 2183.
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The Court fashioned the express advocacy doctrine to safeguard issue
advocacy from campaign finance controls, even though such advocacy might
influence the outcome of an election. The doctrine provides a bright-line,
objective test that protects political speech by focusing solely on the content of
the speaker's words, not the motive in the speaker's mind or the impact on the
speaker's audience, or the proximity to an election, or the phase of the moon.
The doctrine protects issue discussion and advocacy by allowing citizens to
criticize the performance of elected officials at the time that such commentary is
most vital in a democracy: during an election season. It may be inconvenient
for incumbent politicians when groups of citizens spend money to inform the
voters about a politician's public stands on controversial issues like term limits,
but it is of the essence of free speech and democracy.
The McCain-Feingold bill and the Shays-Meehan bill both abandon the
clear and narrow test of express advocacy in favor of an impermissibly
expanded definition of that critical term in an unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad fashion.
* They impose, in effect, a two-month, 60-day blackout before any
federal election for any radio or television advertisement on any issue if that
communication is one that in any way "refers to" any federal candidate.46
Incumbents love that one. Indeed, such proposals have spawned a public
policy phrase, to "deep sixty" a bill, namely, to introduce it within sixty days of
an election, thereby disabling and silencing any legislative advocacy groups
from commenting on a legislator's views or actions on that bill.
* The bills would restrain any communication "expressing unmistakable
and unambiguous support for or opposition to" any federal candidate.47 If that
had been the law in New York City, for example, and the New York Civil
Liberties Union had run an ad during the fall campaign criticizing candidate
Mayor Giuliani's handling of police brutality issues, that would have been
illegal. Police brutality issues have become pervasive in New York City this
year. If McCain-Feingold type laws were in effect, all organized public
commentary on Mayor Giuliani's police brutality policies would become
ensnared in the web of the Federal Election Campaign Act. So too would an
ad run last fall criticizing former Senator D'Amato's stand on abortion and
praising his Democratic opponent, Congressman, now Senator Charles
Schumer. Indeed, there were many ads during that election claiming that,
despite his rhetoric, Senator D'Amato was actively anti-choice. Under the

46

S. 26, 106th Cong. Section 201(3) (1999).

47

Id. at Section 211.
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proposed legislation, such communications informing the public about vital
issues of the day would be run through the meat grinder of the Federal
Election Campaign Act.
Indeed, that is the basic purpose of bills like McCain-Feingold, namely,
to take issue and party speech which is currently beyond the pale of regulation
and bring it within the command and control system of the Act. The clear
purpose and inevitable effect of such unprecedented restrictions on issue
advocacy will be to dampen citizen criticism of incumbent officeholders standing
for re-election at the very time when the public's attention is especially focused
on such issues.
These bills are in clear violation of First Amendment principles. Such
bills would impose unprecedented federal government controls on critical
speech about incumbent politicians at the very time when such commentary is
most vital in a democracy: during an election season. The bill would stifle such
speech by a radical expansion of the Supreme Court's constitutional definition
of what political speech can be subject to campaign finance controls, namely,
only speech which "expressly advocates" the election or defeat of political
candidates. The result would be to bring under federal election controls all of
the individuals and organizations whose speech has been constitutionally
immune, i.e. "free," from any restraint up to now. It would treat such groups as
though they were a PAC or partisan organization, and would subject them to all
of the restraints applicable to campaign organizations.
These proposals embody the kind of unprecedented restraint on issue
advocacy that violates bedrock First Amendment principles, set forth with great
clarity in Buckley and reaffirmed by numerous Supreme Court and lower court
rulings ever since. Indeed, one of the enduring legacies of the Buckley
decision is its reaffirmation and strengthening of the indispensable First
Amendment principle that public discussion of public issues is at the very core
of the freedom of speech and of the press.
First, "issue advocacy" is at the core of democracy. In rejecting the
claim that issue-oriented speech about incumbent politicians could be
regulated because it might influence public opinion and affect the outcome of
elections, the Buckley Court reminded us of the critical relationship between
unfettered issue advocacy and healthy democracy: "Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Constitution."48

48

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
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Second, in an election season, citizens and groups cannot effectively
discuss issues if they are barred from discussing candidates who take stands
on those issues.
For the distinction between discussion of
issues and candidates and advocacy of
election or defeat of candidates may often
dissolve in practical application. Candidates,
especially incumbents, are intimately tied to
public issues involving legislative proposals
and governmental actions.
Not only do
candidates campaign on the basis of their
positions on various public issues, but
campaigns themselves generate issues of
public interest.49
If any reference to a candidate in the context of advocacy on an issue
rendered the speaker or the speech subject to campaign finance controls, the
consequences for First Amendment rights would be intolerable.
Third, to guard against that stifling censorial overbreadth, the Court
fashioned the critical "express advocacy" doctrine, which holds that only
express advocacy of electoral outcomes may be subject to any form of
restraint. Thus, only "communications that in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate"50 can be subject to any
campaign finance controls.
Finally, and most importantly, all speech which does not in express
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate is totally
immune from any regulation; "So long as persons and groups eschew
expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote
the candidate and his views."51
49

Id. at 42.
Id. at 44.

50

51

Id. at 45 (emphasis added). For almost 25 years, the Federal Election Commission
has repeatedly attempted, in one way or another, to expand the concept of express
advocacy well beyond what the courts have permitted. And the courts have
consistently rebuffed the Commission in cases ranging from Federal Election Comm’n.
v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980)
(enbanc) to Right to Life of Dutchess County v. Federal Election Committee, 6 F.
Supp. 2d. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) Indeed, as is well known, in one case the Fourth
Circuit even awarded costs and attorneys fees to an organization harassed by the
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Nor does it matter whether the issue advocacy is communicated on
radio or television, in newspapers or magazines, through direct mail or printed
pamphlets. What counts for constitutional purposes is not the medium, but the
message. By the same token, it is constitutionally irrelevant whether the
message costs $100 or $1,000 or $100,000. It is content, not amount, that
marks the constitutional boundary of allowable regulation and frees issue
advocacy from any impermissible restraint. The control of issue advocacy is
simply beyond the pale of legislative authority.52
This unprecedented provision is an impermissible effort to regulate
issue speech which contains not a whisper of express advocacy, simply
because it "refers to" a federal candidate - who is more often than not a
Congressional incumbent - during an election season. The First Amendment
disables Congress from enacting such a measure regardless of whether the
provision includes a monetary threshold, covers only broadcast media, applies
only to speech during an election season and employs prohibition or disclosure
as its primary regulatory device.
Such proposals would cast a pall over grass-roots lobbying and
advocacy communication by non-partisan issue-oriented groups. It would do
so by imposing burdensome, destructive and unprecedented disclosure and
organizational requirements, and barring use of any organizational funding for
such communications if any corporations or unions made any donations to the
organization. Such proposals would force such groups to choose between
abandoning their issue advocacy or dramatically changing their organizational
structure and sacrificing their speech and associational rights.
Other severe problems with such bills are the new "coordination" rules,
rules which will interfere with the ability of issue organizations to communicate
with elected officials on such issues and later communicate to the public in any
manner on such on issues. And the greatly-expanded activities encompassed
within the new category of "express advocacy" would be subject to those
greatly-expanded coordination restrictions as well. This would be a double
deterrent to public discussion: More would be encompassed within the
definition of express advocacy and more discussion with respect to that

Commission for what was clearly and purely issue speech.
Federal Election
Comm’n. v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir 1997).
52

As the Court said a decade before Buckley in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220
(1966): "No test of reasonableness can save a state statute from invalidation as a
violation of the First Amendment if that law makes it a crime for a newspaper editor to
do no more than urge people to vote one way or another in a publicly held election."
Id.
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expanded universe of express advocacy would be ensnared under the
coordination rules. In effect, any person or group who talked with a
representative about an issue would be subject to the coordination rules and
restraints if they publicly commented on the representative's stance on those
same issues. And coordinated activity becomes highly controlled activity.
Rules like this could even make tax lawyers jealous.
The net result will be to make it virtually impossible for any issue
organization to communicate, directly or indirectly, with any politician on any
issue and then communicate on that same issue to the public.
All of this will have an exceptionally chilling effect on organized issue
advocacy in America by the hundreds and thousands of groups that
enormously enrich political debate. These bills fly in the face of well-settled
Supreme Court doctrine which is designed to keep campaign finance
regulations from ensnaring and overwhelming all political and public speech.
And they will chill issue discussion of the actions of incumbent officeholders
standing for re-election at the very time when it is most vital in a democracy:
during an election season. It may be inconvenient and annoying for incumbent
politicians when groups of citizens spend money to inform the voters about a
politician's public stands on controversial issues, like abortion, but it is the
essence of free speech and democracy.
I. Soft Money
The bill would also impose new controls on "soft money" funding of
political parties, thus leaving them far less able to use their resources to
communicate their message to the voters. Elections are a time when we need
more political party speech and activity, not less. "[i]t can hardly be doubted
that the Constitutional guarantee [the First Amendment] has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."53
Likewise, the unprecedented and sweeping restraints on "soft money"
funding of issue advocacy and political activity and even a new concept called
"federal election activity" by political parties and non-partisan groups alike also
raise severe First Amendment concerns.54 These activities go beyond express
advocacy, and beyond even issue advocacy referring to candidate. The
Orwellian concept of regulatable "federal election activity" basically includes
things like get-out-the-vote drives and other electoral activities on the theory
that the conduct of such praiseworthy democratic activity may somehow be

53

Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).

54

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999, S. 26, 106th Cong. § 101(B)(2) (1999).
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politically motivated or partisan. Will licensing of all "federal election activity" be
next? Or with proposals like this, is it, in fact, already here.
The same principles that protect unrestrained advocacy by issue
groups safeguard issue advocacy and activity by political parties and other
organizations. "Soft money" is funding that does not support "express
advocacy" of the election or defeat of federal candidates, even though it may
exert an influence on the outcome of federal elections in the broadest sense of
that term. As such, it is presumptively protected against government
regulation.
It supports political activity by parties and non-partisan
organizations such as voter registration, voter education and get-out-the-vote
drives. Because such funding is not used for express advocacy, it can be
raised from sources that would be restricted in making federal contributions or
expenditures.55
To be sure, to the extent that soft money funds issue advocacy and
political activities by political parties, it becomes something of a hybrid: it
supports protected and unregulatable issue speech, and activities, but by party
organizations often closely tied to candidates and officeholders. But the kind of
sweeping controls on the amount and source of soft money contributions to
political parties and disclosure of soft money disbursements by other
organizations raise severe constitutional problems. Disclosure, rather than
limitation, of large soft money contributions to political parties, but not to other
organizations, is the more appropriate and less restrictive alternative.56
The proposed legislative labyrinth of restrictions on party funding and
political activity can have no other effect but to deter and discourage precisely
the kind of political party activity that the First Amendment was designed to
protect.
J. A Better Proposal for Reform

55

Richard Briffault, Article: Campaign Finance, The Parties and the Court: A Comment
on Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission, 14 CONST . COMMENTARY 91 (1997); Bradley Smith, The Current Debate
Over Soft Money: Soft Money, Hard Realities, The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft
Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179 (1998).
56

Many of the key Federal Election Commission restraints on the use of soft money for
issue advocacy are being challenged in a case currently pending in the District of
Columbia Circuit brought by the Republican National Committee and the Ohio
Democratic Party as co-plaintiffs. See Republican National Committee v. FEC, 1998
U.S. App. Lexis 38361 (1998) (denying a preliminary injunction against FEC
regulations).
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We are at a constitutional crossroads on campaign finance reform.
Read The New York Times' latest editorial and be left with the sense that if the
Congress does not pass the McCain-Feingold bill by sundown, democracy, not
to mention the Constitution, will be lost forever. Unless the federal government
enacts such measures to clamp down immediately on unregulated "soft money"
and "issue advocacy" and unregistered "federal election activity" and improper
"coordination" between citizens and their elected representatives, the Republic
is surely doomed. The academic and editorial outcry of support for such an
overly broad piece of legislation is almost deafening.
Although McCain-Feingold is unlikely to be passed - let alone be before
the Court - anytime soon, a surrogate for all the command and control
mechanisms of that flawed piece of legislation will be before the Court in the
Missouri contribution limits case.57 The forces of "reform" who brought us the
Federal Election Campaign Act will use that case to insist that low and
restrictive contribution limits must be maintained as the only democratic line of
defense against "corruption" and "undue influence" and the "buying of
elections." Should the Court agree and sustain extremely low legislativelycompelled contribution limits, that judicial mandate will be used by "reform"
forces as the doctrinal pivot to justify attempts to close every "loophole" in
campaign finance controls that can be "plugged" by reference to the reaffirmed
authority to limit campaign contributions. That is precisely the theory to justify
McCain-Feingold's extraordinary expansion of the range of campaign finance
controls by making virtually all political party funding and most issue advocacy
funding and some "federal election activity" funding subject to the regime of the
FECA, particularly its core restraints on the source and size of political
contributions.
For 25 years, those of us associated with the ACLU have urged a
different approach to the campaign finance dilemma, a triad approach based
on three essential principles.
First, raise or even repeal all limits on campaign contributions or
expenditures. They offend the principles of the First Amendment, they distort
First Amendment doctrine, and they simply don't work. Increasingly, there is a
growing amount of editorial and political support for at least raising contribution
ceilings to the level of inflation, so that the federal ceiling would be $3,000, not
$1,000.58 Except for those extremists who would wish for all political activity to
57

See Shrink Missouri PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert granted, 119
S. Ct. 901 (1999).
58

Stirrings on Campaign Finance, W ASH. P OST , March 19, 1999, A28; Time to Reform
Campaign Reforms, CHICAGO TRIBUNE , March 7, 1999, at p.20; Paul Merrion, Biz
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be publicly funded only, with no right of private contribution or expenditure, no
one can justify on policy grounds the retention of the $1,000 limit for federal
campaigns.
Second, insure timely - indeed, instantaneous - and effective disclosure
of large contributions to major political parties and committees, so that the
public has immediate access to this information. And make sure that these
disclosures come out before the election and are widely publicized by the
media and watchdog groups like Common Cause so that we will know before
the election about the fund-raising activities of candidates and their parties.
That is the most appropriate and democratic remedy to deal with the concerns
over undue access and influence by contributors on elected officials. Let the
people decide who's too cozy with the fat cats and the so-called "special
interests." Let the people know about the "China connection" to Presidential
fundraising before the election, not after. Let the public know that the
President, who agreed only to use public funding for his political campaign in
1996, raised funds for and drafted the copy of Democratic Party campaign
advertisements in 1995 that guaranteed his re-election before the official
campaign even began.
Third, provide a meaningful and broad-scale package of serious public
funding and benefits for all qualified political candidates. This is a strategy to
provide floors to support and expand political opportunity, not ceilings to
restrict political activity. That would be a real investment in democracy.
The most effective and least constitutionally problematic route to
genuine campaign finance reform is a system of equitable and adequate public
financing. But proposals for public financing need to avoid certain pitfalls. First,
they should not compel candidates and parties to limit their political speech in
order to have that speech subsidized by government. Instead, the principle
should be one of building floors to support political speech, not ceilings to
restrict it. Second, public financing schemes should avoid mechanisms
whereby benefits and subsidies to one candidate are triggered by the
campaign funding and campaign speech activities of other candidates and
even independent groups. Such contingent funding arrangements can confer
too much power on government to determine what campaign activities or
speech entitles other candidates to increased funds or fund-raising
opportunities. Third, public financing arrangements should be as inclusive as
possible, so that new political voices are enabled, rather than stifled. Finally,

Backs Bid to Curb Soft Money: A New Corporate-Led Bid for Campaign Reform,
CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, April 5, 1999, p.3; Even legislative proposals that would
ban soft money entirely, would at least raise the hard money limits on contributions to
parties to make up the shortfall.
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public financing should take a mix of different forms so that candidates and
parties are not dependent on one single governmental funding source.
If a serious public funding program were coupled with an easing of fund
raising restrictions on those candidates who do not opt into the public funding
system, the combination might give candidates a real choice about the best
way to get their messages out and the voters a real choice about which
candidates they prefer.
Here are some of the components of such a campaign finance benefits
package.
* Give modest tax credits of up to $100 or even $500 for private political
contributions to any political party or candidate - Democratic, Republican or
Socialist. Now that would be the most straightforward and democratic form of
public financing of politics -- through private choices, publicly amplified. If 50
million voters gave $100 each, you could fund all of federal politics in a year to
the tune of about $5,000,000,000 without a penny going through government
hands. Now that's a good use of the coming federal budget surplus.
* Give free franked mail privileges to all qualified political candidates,
not just Democrats and Republicans, at least during the general election.
Incumbents get it free for most of their terms in office, why not let challengers
have the same perk during the election season.59 It would facilitate political
communication and reduce the dependence on private funding. That's a
serious way to help level the playing field between incumbents and challengers.
* Make serious amounts of public funding or matching funds available
to all federal candidates.60
59

In this regard, the Court’s decision allowing broad government regulation of political
party choices regarding the “fusion” tickets was a disappointment. See Timmons v.
Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). So too was the Court’s decision
allowing public broadcasting stations broad discretion to exclude a “non-serious”
Congressional candidate from publicly-sponsored televised candidate debates. See
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes 523 U.S. 666 (1998); see
generally, Joel Gora, Forbes, Finley and Free Speech: Does He Who Pays the Piper
Always Get to Call the Tune, 15 TOURO L. REV 965 (1999).
60

Jonathan Rauch, How to Repair America’s Campaign Finance System, Part I: Give
Polls Free Money, No Rules, U.S. NEWS AND W ORLD REPORT , Dec. 29, 1997/Jan. 5,
1998, p.54-56. Concluding that our current system of campaign finance is a disaster,
one journalist, Jonathan Rauch, proposed in U.S. News and World Report that
Congressional candidates be given a real choice between total and extremely
generous public funding - perhaps $500,000 for Congressional candidates, with tough
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* Although posing severe, and perhaps insurmountable, constitutional
difficulties, afford candidates free air time, with no restrictions or conditions, to
get their message across to the voters.61
All of these approaches would have the collateral benefit of allowing
candidates to spend less time raising money and more time raising issues.
And these strategies have one other thing in common: they expand
political opportunity without limiting political speech. They say that if there is to
be any leveling principle in the First Amendment, it should be one of level up,
not level down. More speech, not silence coerced by law. Time has shown the
wisdom of that approach and the folly of an approach based on limits. That
should not be surprising because the enduring wisdom of the "more speech"
solution is nothing less than the enduring wisdom and very essence of the First
Amendment itself:
"Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."

restrictions on private contributions, or forgoing public funding with no restrictions on
contributions or expenditures. Implausible? Naive? Crazy? Any more than our current
campaign finance system?
61

For a strong argument against the constitutionality of requiring broadcasters to
provide free time for politicians, see LILLIAN BEVIER, IS FREE TV FOR FEDERAL
CANDIDATES CONSTITUTIONAL? (1999); see also, Joel Gora, Five Fatal Flaws with
Proposals for Free TV, Talk presented at American Enterprise Institute, February
1999.
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